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1.  Introduction 
 
 
G. E. Moore famously observed [1942: 543] that to assert 
I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did  
would be ‘absurd’.  Such an assertion is unlike semantically odd Liar-type assertions such 
as ‘What I’m now saying is not true’ since my Moorean assertion might be true: you may 
consistently suppose that I went to the pictures last Tuesday but fail to believe that I did.  
So a natural way of explaining the absurdity is to locate a contradiction-like phenomenon 
while recognising that no contradiction lies in my words. 
It seems no less absurd of me to silently believe the content of Moore’s example.  
So a promising strategy is to deliver the explanation of the absurdity of Moorean 
assertion in terms of that of Moorean belief.  Consistently with this, Shoemaker observes 
that 
If I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p but  
 
not conversely1 
 
The failure of the converse is supported by at least one successful prediction, since it 
correctly excludes my assertion  
 I’m asserting nothing now  
from the class of absurdities that are essentially like Moore’s example2.  After all, I could 
quietly believe in my continuing obedience to a Trappist vow of silence in a perfectly 
sensible way. 
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An important fact still often overlooked in the debate is that Moore also observes 
that to say, ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ would be likewise ‘absurd’ 
[1944: 204].  Unlike his first example, which has the omissive form  
(om) p & I don’t believe that p,  
this has the comissive form,  
(com) p & I believe that not-p3
This semantic difference is inherited from the genuine difference between atheists and 
agnostics. The result is the difference between the specific commission of a mistake in 
belief and the specific omission of true belief. 
So any adequate account of Moorean absurdity must explain the absurdity of both 
omissive and comissive assertions and beliefs in accordance with Shoemaker’s 
constraint4. 
 Such an explanation would also have to identify other examples that share the 
paradigmatic absurdity of Moore’s own.  Such candidates mention knowledge, for 
example,   
 It is raining but I know I don’t believe that it is raining 
and 
It is raining but I believe that I don’t know that it is not raining 
as well as Sorensen’s examples in which belief operators are iterated such as the omissive  
God exists but I don’t believe that I’m a theist  
and the comissive  
God exists but I believe that I’m an atheist.    
These have the forms  
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(om1) p & I don’t believe that I believe that p 
and  
(com1) p & I believe that I believe that not-p 
where the superscript denotes the order of iteration.  
Sorensen observes [2000: 29] that as iteration increases, omissive absurdity 
decreases, while comissive type absurdity does not. Thus with four iterations 
(om4) p & I don’t believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that p 
 
seems less absurd to believe or assert than om1, whereas the absurdity of believing or  
 
asserting    
 
(com4) p & I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that not-p 
 
is undiminished. And om1 or com1 seem less absurd to believe or assert than om or com.  
What is the explanation of this? 
In §2 I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean belief.  From this I generalise 
a definition of Moorean absurdity in §3.  In §4 I argue for an account of the absurdity of 
Moorean assertion that obeys Shoemaker’s constraint and in §5 defend it against two 
objections.  In §6 I use this account to identify those examples coined in terms of 
knowledge that are genuinely absurd in the same way as Moore’s own examples. In §§7-
10 I use the account to explain the non-Moorean absurdity of Sorensen’s iterated 
examples. 
 
2. The absurdity of Moorean belief 
 
All commentators who explain the absurdity of Moorean belief (for example [Heal 1994:  
 
21-22]) appeal to the principle that belief distributes over conjunction:   
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 If I believe that (p & q) then I believe that p and I believe that q 
Given this, if I believe that (p & I don’t believe that p), then I believe that p.  But then 
what I believe is false, since its second conjunct is false. Although my belief is not a 
belief in a necessary falsehood, my belief is self-falsifying. Although what I believe 
might be might be true of me and although I might believe it, it cannot be true of me if I 
believe it.  By contrast I can truly believe Moore’s comissive example.  For if I believe 
that (p & I believe that not-p) then again I believe that p, which is consistent with the 
second conjunct of what I believe, but only if I hold contradictory beliefs about whether 
p.  Moreover, discerning this fact, as we just saw, requires a minimum of reflection5. So it 
is not difficult to see why I am irrational in continuing to hold such a belief.   
In believing Moore’s omissive proposition I have a self-falsifying belief. In 
believing Moore’s comissive proposition, I escape this irrationality only by the 
irrationality of holding contradictory beliefs. Thus both beliefs are equally absurd 
because these two failures of theoretical rationality are equally severe.  For both types of 
belief are equally useless as guides to the truth. Any evidence that (absurdly) justifies me 
in believing the omissive proposition would justify me in believing what is then false. 
Likewise any evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto evidence against my belief that 
not-p and conversely.  Nonetheless the two irrationalities are distinct, as we should 
expect from the clear difference between an instance of lack of true belief and an instance 
of mistaken belief. 
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3 Defining Moorean absurdity 
  
Generalising from Moore’s two examples, we may say that  
(MP) Any proposition is Moorean just in case it is a possible truth that self-reports no  
  irrationality but a belief in it is self-falsifying on pain of contradictory beliefs. 
This definition properly allows that there is nothing absurd in my believing or asserting 
   At least one of my present beliefs is mistaken 
   
To believe it would be a perfectly reasonable belief in my own infallibility that is has 
most probably been long true of me. Thus no deep contradiction-like flaw in me is 
revealed.  
Of course, my belief in my own disclaimer guarantees that I have at least one 
false belief. For if my belief that I have at least one mistaken belief is mistaken then none 
of my beliefs are mistaken, including my belief in my disclaimer. On the one hand this 
means I have inconsistent beliefs, namely a set of beliefs that cannot all be true. But on 
the other, it also means that my belief in my own mistakenness is infallible. Since I was 
most likely mistaken in some of my beliefs anyway, such a belief represents a useful 
heuristic for finding out the truth about which specific mistaken beliefs I hold by looking 
again at the quality of evidence.  
  This shows that Moorean belief is not to be analysed in terms of inconsistent 
beliefs but rather in terms of contradictory beliefs (a pair of belief that contradict each 
other).  Inconsistency in my beliefs does not necessarily undermine my justification in the 
way my self-contradictory or contradictory beliefs do. Any evidence for my belief that p 
is ipso facto evidence against my belief that not-p and conversely.  Thus any evidence for 
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the truth of my self-contradictory belief that (p & not-p) is evidence for its falsehood.  By 
contrast, evidence for my belief in my occasional mistakenness need not count against 
any of my other beliefs, nor visa versa. I would now have inconsistent beliefs, but not 
contradictory ones6.  My true belief in my occasional mistakenness does not entail beliefs 
that contradict each other, since we may consistently suppose that I don’t believe that all 
of my beliefs are true. 
 Since the mere truth of a Moorean proposition does not constitute any theoretical 
irrationality on my part,  
 It is raining but I believe that it is raining without the least justification 
is also excluded from the class of Moorean absurdities (compare [Alder 1999: 267- 
 68]).   
 
 4. The absurdity of Moorean assertion 
 
When I make a Moorean assertion to you, no absurdity arises if you merely believe that 
my words are true.  For you can quite sensibly believe that I am ignorant in a specific 
way or that I hold a specific mistaken belief.  But with two harmless exceptions that I will 
discuss in the next section, my full intention in making an assertion to you is not simply 
to get you to believe my words. In attempting to inform or let you know that p, I intend to 
get you to know that p.  When I lie to you that p, I intend to get you to mistakenly believe 
that p.  In any such case I intend to get you to believe my words.   But I cannot succeed in 
this attempt unless I also get you to think that I am sincere in making the assertion. For if 
you think that I’m play-acting or recognise that I’m lying then you have no reason to 
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accept my words, so my attempt to impart knowledge or lie to you will fail.  Since I 
should see with minimal reflection that this is so, my full intention must be to get you to 
believe my words by getting you to think me sincere in uttering them. It follows that I 
must intend to get you to believe that I am sincerely telling the truth.  In other words, I 
aim to make you believe me.   
  When my assertion is Moorean this aim is necessarily frustrated. It seems 
uncontroversial that assertion distributes over conjunction: 
  If I assert that (p and q) then I assert that p and I assert that q 
So if I tell you that (p and I don’t believe that p) then I tell you that p.  So in virtue of 
believing me sincere, you must think that I believe that p.  But given the same principle, I 
also tell you that I don’t believe that p.  So in virtue of believing that I tell the truth, you 
must think that I don’t believe that p.  So you must have contradictory beliefs if you 
believe me.   
  In the comissive case, if I tell you that (p and I don’t believe that p) then since 
assertion distributes over conjunction, I tell you that p.  So in virtue of believing me 
sincere, you must again think that I believe that p.  But I also tell you that I believe that 
not-p.  So in virtue of believing that I tell the truth, you must think that I believe that not- 
p.  So this time you must think that I have contradictory beliefs.   
 So you cannot believe me in either case without thinking me theoretically 
irrational or being so yourself.  Since I should assume that we would both charitably 
avoid ascriptions of such irrationality if possible, I am in position to see with minimal 
reflection in either case that my plan to be believed is bound to fail.  Accordingly I should 
revise my plans.  If I don’t then I’m practically irrational.  
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5.  Neutralising two objections 
 
I now anticipate two objections.  The first is that there are two types of assertion that do 
not fit the central account just given.  For if I make either type of assertion to you, I do 
not aim to make you think I am sincerely telling the truth.  The first case is when I say 
something to you merely in order to ‘wind you up’. For example, suppose that I know 
that you think highly of Bush’s intelligence, an opinion I in fact share.  Nonetheless I 
insincerely state that Bush is a moron in order to ‘rattle your cage’.  Here my intention is 
to ensure you remain verbally opposed to my words by accepting my sincerity.  
  The second case arises when on learning that you have just discovered that I am a 
habitual liar, I decide to tell the truth for once.  So when you ask me if the pubs are still 
open, I tell you the truth that they are, in order to deceive you into mistakenly thinking 
that they are not.  Here my intention is to get you to believe that my words are false by 
rejecting my sincerity.  
However both examples are accommodated by the central account.  In the first 
example, I can hardly hope to prolong verbal disagreement with you unless you think 
(mistakenly) that I’m sincere.  But I am in position to see that you couldn’t take me to 
hold a Moorean belief unless you thought I was irrational.  In the second example, my  
intention in asserting that p is to get you to mistakenly believe that not-p.  But this means 
that I myself believe that p.  But when the assertion is Moorean, I cannot rationally 
believe what I assert.  Moreover, my attempt to make you think me insincere is parasitic 
upon my expectation that you will normally think me sincere.  After all, such an assertion 
is a double bluff.  So the full description of such an assertion includes the fact that when I 
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thus assert to you that p I intend to get you to mistakenly believe that I’m insincere 
because I know that normally I will get you to think I’m sincere.  But when my assertion 
is Moorean, this is bound to fail, because there is no normal case in which I can sensibly 
try to make you think I hold a Moorean belief.   
The second objection I anticipate is that I am not necessarily guilty of practical 
irrationality in making an assertion when I know that I will not be believed. For I 
might feel sure, under your interrogation, that you think me guilty, and yet protest, ‘I’m 
damn well innocent I tell you’ in the knowledge that you won’t change your mind.   
But my assertion may have different points and may be directed at different 
audiences.  This disarms the objection.  Suppose that after an hour of protesting, I realise 
that you will never accept my innocence.  Surely it would be pointless to persist in 
attempting to make you accept my innocence by accepting my sincerity because I would 
be trying to do something I know will fail.  Instead I might sensibly repeat the protest but 
with the different intention of merely making you think I’m sincere.  If I know I really am 
guilty I might be feigning sincerity to get away with a lighter sentence, so that you say 
afterwards, ‘He's still guilty all right, but the poor chap really believes he didn't assault 
that publican. He must have been really drunk’.  But if I now realise that you will punish 
me for my guilt regardless of any misguided sincerity on my part or see that you will 
never revise your verdict that I'm telling a lie then there is again no point in my 
assertions.  The sensible thing to do is to save my breath.   
Now suppose that I continue to protest my innocence for the sake of a camera that 
I know is recording the interrogation. My assertion now has the different point of 
convincing relevant persons who might watch the tape of my innocence, or failing that, at 
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least of my sincerity.  If I now learn that all who will watch the tape are just as stony as 
you then surely the assertion would have no rational point, since we have now effectively 
removed any potentially responsive audience from the picture. Unless I now I stick my 
head out of the cell window and shout ‘I'm innocent!’ in the hope of imparting this 
information to any stray passer-by, continuing to proclaim my innocence would be like 
talking aloud to myself.  Doing this as an assertion would require an irrationally divided 
self in which one self reminds or convinces the other self of the first self's innocence.  On 
the other hand my point in repeating to myself, ‘I'm innocent’ might be not to make an 
assertion at all, but merely to keep my spirits up or to exercise my lungs. In such a case 
my utterances are more like inspirational songs than bona fide assertions. 
This account of Moorean absurdity is maximally economical in requiring only the 
principle that belief distributes over conjunction in explaining the absurdity of Moorean 
belief and the parallel principle that assertion distributes over conjunction in explaining 
the absurdity of Moorean assertion.  Moreover the two accounts fit together in two ways 
that satisfy Shoemaker’s constraint.  Firstly, what you must believe if you are to believe 
me when I make a Moorean assertion is identical to what is the case if I truly believe my 
own words.  Secondly, since part of my aim in making a Moorean assertion is to 
convince you of my sincerity, in making a Moorean assertion I aim to get you to attribute 
a Moorean belief to me.  Since I am in a position to see that this is a license to judge me 
theoretically irrational, one you will withhold rather than think I’m joking, I should 
realise on minimal reflection that the point of my assertion will not succeed. 
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6. Moorean absurdity and knowledge 
 
I cannot know a Moorean proposition, despite the fact that it might be true. To see this is 
so, consider three epistemic principles.  The first is merely the facticity of knowledge: 
 If I know that p then p 
An additional principle that now unproblematic is the doxacity of knowledge:   
If I know that p then I believe that p.  
Finally, as with belief, it seems unobjectionable that knowledge distributes over 
conjunction: 
If I know that (p & q) then I know that p and I know that q 
Now suppose that I know that (p & I don’t believe that p).  Since knowledge distributes 
over conjunction, I know that I don’t believe that p, in which case the facticity of 
knowledge ensures that I don’t believe that p.  But the doxacity of knowledge shows this 
is impossible, since I also know that p. In the comissive case, the logical impossibility of 
my knowing that (p & I believe that not-p) can be likewise demonstrated just in case we 
grant that knowledge excludes belief in falsehood: 
If I know that p then I don’t believe that not-p.  
But having granted the doxacity of knowledge we must grant this new principle as well. 
Otherwise we would allow the possibility that I know that p while holding contradictory 
beliefs about whether p. Since this makes my belief that p irrational or non-truth-tracking, 
it could not be part of my knowledge that p.  An alternative route to the unknowability of 
a Moorean proposition is simply the fact that Moorean beliefs are irrational. 
A proposition may cease to be Moorean if we replace ‘believe’ with ‘know’. 
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Making this change to Moore’s comissive example (letting ‘p’ stand for ‘It is raining’ this 
time) yields 
It is raining but I know it isn’t 
 
But because of the facticity of knowledge, this is a semantic self-contradiction. So MP 
correctly excludes it from the class of Moorean absurdities.  The replacement in Moore’s 
omissive example yields  
It is raining but I don’t know it is 
This is not a Moorean proposition either but for different reasons.  It would be true in a 
case in which I am justified in truly believing that it is raining yet fail to know that it is 
raining because my justification is inadequate for knowledge.  There seems to be no 
failure of rationality on my part in believing that this is so. Admittedly, an ideal thinker 
would know whatever he believes.  But failing this ideal does not seem constitute the 
deep irrationality of Moorean belief. In such circumstances I could sensibly report that 
failing to you. Suppose you ask me if rain is imminent.  I look at the sky and say 
truthfully, ‘Yes it’s going to rain’.  If I qualify my forecast with ‘So I think, but I 
wouldn’t say I know it for a fact’ then this cautious admission of ignorance does not 
prevent you from sensibly believing me, nor does it impugn my rationality. 
By contrast we may coin further Moorean absurdities by including the second 
conjunct of Moore’s propositions within the scope of my knowledge.  Then om becomes 
It is raining but I know I don’t believe that it is raining 
This is a possible truth that self-reports no irrationality, since I might sensibly recognise 
my lack of opinion about the weather when I’m incarcerated in a dark cellar, despite the 
rain outside.  But to believe it would falsify it.  For if I believe it then I believe that it is 
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raining, which falsifies the second conjunct of what I believe because of the facticity of 
knowledge.  If you believe me when I assert it to you then you think I believe that it is 
raining (in virtue of thinking me sincere) and you think I know that I don’t believe that it 
is raining (in virtue of thinking me a truth-teller). Since my knowledge is factive, you 
hold beliefs that are in semantic contradiction with each other.  Since you should realise 
this with minimal reflection, you should not believe me, a fact I may also work out with 
minimal reflection. Likewise  
 It is raining but I know I believe that it is not raining 
is true of me when I sensibly recognise my belief that it is not raining in circumstances in 
which the absence of rain is deceptively engineered. But if I correctly believe it then the 
fact that belief distributes over conjunction together with the facticity of knowledge, 
ensure that I have contradictory beliefs about rain.  If you believe me when I assert it to 
you then you think I believe that it is raining (in virtue of thinking me sincere) and you 
think I know that I believe that it is not raining (in virtue of thinking me a truth-teller). 
Since my knowledge is factive, you should think that I hold contradictory beliefs and so 
should refuse to believe me on the assumption that I’m minimally rational, a refusal that I 
too can foresee with minimal reflection.   
Suppose we now exchange ‘believe’ with ‘know’ in  
It is raining but I know I don’t believe that it is raining 
yielding 
 It is raining but I believe I don’t know that it is raining. 
This is not a Moorean proposition.  It would be true in a case in which I truly believe that 
my justification for my belief that it is raining is inadequate for knowledge.  I do not 
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seem irrational in virtue of being aware of this belief or reporting it to you.  By contrast, 
if we perform the same exchange on  
It is raining but I know I believe that it is not raining 
we get the Moorean 
It is raining but I believe I know that it is not raining 
This is a possible truth that self-reports no irrationality.  For it is true of me when the 
absence of rain is deceptively engineered in such a convincing way to make me 
mistakenly think I know that it is raining.  But intuitively it would be absurd of me to 
believe or assert it.  If I truly believe it then since belief distributes over conjunction, I 
believe that p yet also believe that I know that not-p. These beliefs are in semantic 
contradiction.  Since my knowledge is factive, my belief that I know that not-p is true 
only if my belief that p is false.  If you are to believe me when I assert it to you then you 
must think that I believe that p and also think that I believe that I know that not-p.  Thus 
you must think that I hold contradictory beliefs.  After minimal reflection I should see 
this and so foresee that you will refuse to believe me rather than uncharitably judge me 
irrational. 
 
7. Sorensen’s account of the iterated cases  
 
Sorensen thinks that com1 and com4 share the paradigmatic absurdity of com.  He writes 
[2000: 42]   
My solution endorses the intuition that ‘p & Bn ~p’ is a Moorean sentence for all n, 
but ‘p & ~Bnp’ need not be a Moorean sentence when n is a large number. ‘p & 
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Bna~p’ does not entail that a has a specifiable directly opposed belief.  But ‘Ba(p & 
Bna~p)’ entails that a has directly opposed beliefs about p, under the assumption that 
a believes the consequences of his beliefs and that ‘p & Bna~p’ is true.  This 
entailment follows directly for n = 1.  When n > 1, the entailment is secured by a 
necessary condition for self-attributing higher-order beliefs.  
The condition in question is that if I believem+n that p then I believen that p [2000: 39-42] 
namely a recursive application of the principle of belief elimination:  
If I believe that I believe that p then I believe that p. 
Sorensen appeals to this principle together with the principle that belief is closed under 
entailment:   
If p entails q and I believe that p then I believe that q.   
It follows that I cannot correctly believe com1 unless I hold contradictory, or ‘directly 
opposed’ beliefs about whether p.  If I believe that (p & I believe that I believe that not-p) 
then a logical entailment of what I believe is that p, so I believe that p.  But if my belief 
in com1 is correct then I believe that I believe that not-p, in which case the principle of 
belief elimination ensures that I believe that not-p. Since that principle may be applied 
recursively, the same diagnosis of the absurdity will hold for any order of iteration of the 
belief-operator, as in com4.  It also applies to com in which case the principle is not 
needed.   Sorensen’s account diagnoses no such absurdity in om1.  If I believe that (p & I 
don’t believe that I believe that p) then a logical entailment of what I believe is that p, so 
I believe that p.  But if my belief in om1 is true then I don’t believe that I believe that p, in 
which case the principle of belief elimination fails to apply.   
But there are a number of problems with this account. Firstly, Sorensen must 
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explain the absurdity of om as follows: If I believe that (p & I don’t believe that p) then a 
logical entailment of what I believe is that p, so I believe that p.  But if my belief in om is 
true then I don’t believe that p. But this is not, as Sorensen supposes, a case of contradictory 
beliefs but rather a flat contradiction.  Secondly, I do seem to be absurd in some way if I 
believe om1.  
Finally, Sorensen’s appeal to the success of the principle that belief is closed 
under entailment is problematic. It is clear that it fails as a psychological principle. I may 
believe that a triangle is equilateral without believing that it is equiangular.  Nor can it be 
true of me as a principle of ideal rationality.  Suppose that I believe that Singapore is 
democracy but fail to believe that it is either a democracy or a plutocracy because I have no 
idea what a plutocracy is. This failure may represent an indictment of my knowledge but 
hardly counts as a failure of theoretical rationality. Moreover, since an infinite series of 
similar disjunctions are entailed by a first disjunct, the principle compels us to say that an 
ideally rational believer would believe each of an infinite series of similar disjunctions.  
Since this is unlikely for any human believer, it follows that the principle prohibits any 
human believer from being ideally rational. 
Sorensen tries to circumvent this difficulty by making my ‘thorough obedience’ to  
the principle that belief is closed under entailment, a test of my degree of ideal rationality 
[1988: 37].  But although we should admit that degrees of rationality are vague, surely there 
is a difference between total obedience and none.  So what is missing from Sorensen’s 
account is a principled place on this scale that is distinctive of the degree of Moorean 
irrationality. This means that Moorean absurdity cannot be explained in terms of failure of 
the principle either. For such failure is a form of theoretical irrationality at all, it is a very 
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mild form of it.  By contrast, a Moorean believer is guilty of a severe theoretical 
irrationality.   
 
8. The non-Moorean absurdity of Sorensen’s iterated cases 
 
In fact, MP shows that om1 and com1 are not Moorean at all.  Admittedly, they are 
possible truths that self-report no irrationality. As a case of om1, if I have no way of 
discovering the truth that it’s raining (because I have been incarcerated in a sealed room), 
I might reasonably withhold the belief that it’s raining (by suspending judgement either 
way) without (mistakenly) thinking I believe it’s raining. Likewise I might be perfectly 
justified, not only in (mistakenly) believing that it’s not raining (when my captors fool 
me with the illusion of dry weather), but also in recognising this belief, so the bare truth 
of com1 constitutes no irrationality in me either.  But such beliefs are not self-falsifying 
on pain of contradictory beliefs.  If I hold a true belief in either then since belief 
distributes over conjunction, I believe that p.  But this does not contradict the second 
conjunct of om1, namely that I don’t believe that I believe that p.  Moreover the fact that I 
believe that p is consistent with the second conjunct of com1, namely that I believe that I 
believe that not-p, in a way that allows me to avoid holding a pair of contradictory 
beliefs.  Nonetheless I seem to be absurd in some sense to believe either.  What is the 
explanation of this non-Moorean but related absurdity? 
 The principle that belief distributes over conjunction helps explains the related 
absurdity as follows.  In believing om or com, I am not only guilty of the major failing 
that my belief is self-falsifying or entails contradictory beliefs but am guilty of a minor 
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failing (of introspective non-omniscience or fallibility) as well. When the Moorean belief 
is iterated, the major failing is expunged but the minor failing remains. And as iterations 
increase, the minor failing of omissive belief diminishes, unlike that of comissive belief.  
The principle of belief-elimination is one half of the principle of introspective  
omniscience: 
If I believe that p then I believe that I believe that p 
 & 
If I don’t believe that p then I believe that I don’t believe that p 
just as the converse of the principle of belief elimination is one half of the principle of 
introspective infallibility,  
If I believe that I believe that p then I believe that p 
 & 
If I believe that I don’t believe that p then I don’t believe that p  
The failure of either constitutes instances of my ignorance or mistaken belief about my 
own beliefs.  But since introspection is normally an authoritative source of justification 
for beliefs about my own mental states, such instances also represent a failure of 
theoretical rationality.   
 For example, my assertion that I don’t believe that women are inferior may be  
sincere because I am blind to the way I treat them. You may be in a better position to 
recognise that my boorish behaviour is the manifestation of the existing belief that  
sincerely deny having. In such a case I fail the second conjunct of the principle of  
introspective infallibility. In the same circumstances I might also sincerely avow a belief  
that women are not inferior, although you can see that I believe they are. That would be a  
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case in which what I really believe contradicts what I think I believe. Yet again in the  
same example, although I may sincerely disavow the belief that women are inferior, you  
might recognise that I hold it. This would be a case in which I hold a belief that that I fail  
to recognise, and so fail the first conjunct of the principle of introspective omniscience. 
 On the other hand, since omniscience and infallibility are God-like qualities, such 
failures seem minor irrationalities in comparison with the major irrationality of holding 
beliefs that are self-falsifying.  
Since belief distributes over conjunction, if I believe that (p & I don’t believe that  
p) then I believe that p and I believe that I don’t believe that p. In other words, I 
mistakenly think I lack a specific belief  (for example that women are inferior) and so fail 
to be introspectively infallible.  So in holding an omissive Moorean belief I am guilty of 
the major irrationality of falsifying that belief as well as the minor irrationality of failing 
to be introspectively infallible. By contrast, if I believe om1 then the major irrationality is 
expunged but a minor irrationality remains.  For if I truly believe that (p & I don’t believe 
that I believe that p) then I believe that p (since belief distributes over conjunction) but I 
don’t believe that I believe that p (in virtue of the truth of the second conjunct of what I 
believe).  This is neither a flat contradiction nor a contradiction in belief, but rather a 
failure of introspective omniscience.  I may escape the major irrationality of holding a 
self-falsifying belief by the minor irrationality of that failure.  Therefore I am less 
irrational in believing om1 than in believing om.  
We may explain the decrease in absurdity of believing com1 in parallel fashion. 
Since belief distributes over conjunction, if I believe that (p & I believe that not-p) then I 
believe that p but I believe that I believe that not-p. In other words, what I really believe 
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contradicts what I think I believe (as when I think I believe that women are not inferior 
but in fact believe that they are).  So I fail to be introspectively infallible on pain of 
contradictory beliefs about whether p.  Thus in holding a comissive Moorean belief I am 
guilty of both the major irrationality of falsifying that belief and the minor irrationality of 
failing to be introspectively infallible unless I am guilty of the major irrationality of 
contradictory beliefs.  By contrast, if I believe com1 then the major irrationality is 
expunged but a minor irrationality remains.  For if I truly believe that (p & I believe that I 
believe that not-p) then I believe that p (since belief distributes over conjunction) but I 
believe that I believe that not-p (in virtue of the truth of the second conjunct of what I 
believe).  This is neither a flat contradiction nor a contradiction in belief, but rather a 
failure of introspective infallibility provided I avoid contradictory beliefs. So I may 
escape both major irrationalities of holding a self-falsifying belief or holding 
contradictory beliefs by the minor the minor irrationality of that failure. Therefore I am 
less irrational in believing com1 than in believing com.  
Note that even if the irrationality of failing to be introspectively omniscient or 
introspectively infallible were equally severe as that of self-falsifying belief or 
contradictory beliefs, this conclusion would still stand, since any two irrationalities are 
worse than one alone. 
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9. The differential decrease of related absurdity in belief 
 
The supplement of one other intuitive principle explains why subsequent iterations only 
decrease omissive absurdity. If I hold the true belief that  
(om2) p & I don’t believe that I believe that I believe that p 
then I believe that p (since belief distributes over conjunction) and I don’t believe that I 
believe that I believe that p (because the second conjunct of what I believe is true).  But 
then I fail to be introspectively omniscient, since double application of the first conjunct 
of the principle of introspective omniscience to the fact that I believe that p, results in the 
contradiction that I both have and lack the belief that I believe that I believe that p.  
This minor failing is mitigated by the increased complexity of what I fail to believe. 
The mitigation follows from the fact that belief requires the ability of thought:  
If I believe that p then I have the ability to think the thought that p.  
Your question, ‘Do eels eat glass?’ may make me newly conscious of my long-held belief 
that they don’t, but although I have never had thoughts of glass-eating eels before, I have 
long had the ability to have them. This requirement explains why although we may 
intuitively suppose that a dog has rudimentary beliefs about the food in its bowl (which 
helps us explain its behaviour as it strains at its leash), we hesitate to attribute to it the 
belief that it will be beaten in Lent. Clearly it does not have the concept of Lent and so 
lacks the ability to think thoughts of Lent. The requirement also explains our difficulty in 
characterising the beliefs of other species in any fine-grained way, since it is difficult to 
specify, using the linguistic expressions of our thoughts, exactly what concepts (or 
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derivatively, thoughts) are available to those with radically different linguistic capacities 
and ways of behaving.   
Admittedly, the requirement is challenged by the fact that in one sense I can 
believe things on authority that I do not understand. For example, I may believe an 
authority on physics that assures me that entropy is increasing although I have no idea 
what entropy is. But believing that she has said something true is different from believing 
what she says. Although I don’t believe that entropy is increasing, I do believe that she 
has said something true (although I don’t know what) since although I cannot think 
thoughts of entropy, I can think the thought that by using the word ‘entropy’, she has said 
something true.  Similarly, when presented with the inscription, 
1 + 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1+ 1 + 1 is greater than 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1  
I can sincerely and truly assert ‘That’s true’ without having the thought that 10 is greater 
than 7.  What I correctly believe is that the inscription says something true, in virtue of 
correctly believing that the number denoted by the left-hand side is greater than that 
denoted by the right-hand side. 
A different sort of apparent counterexample arises when I seem to have only a  
partial grasp of the content of my belief. For example, mistakenly thinking that arthritis is 
an inflammation of bones as well as joints, I sincerely utter to you ‘Arthritis has spread to 
my thigh’. Intuitively we feel that I mistakenly believe something to do with arthritis. The 
correctness of this intuition seems to rule out the required ability of thought.  For since 
my inability to reliably distinguish cases of arthritis from other aliments precludes my 
grasp of the concept of arthritis embedded in would-be thoughts of arthritis, it follows 
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that I can’t think any thoughts of arthritis.  Thus I don’t hold the belief, mistaken or 
otherwise, that arthritis has spread to my thigh.   
But surely I do mistakenly believe that inflammation of the joints and bones has 
spread to my thigh.  Moreover I mistakenly believe that what you call ‘arthritis’ has 
spread to my thigh.  Since both inflammation of the joints and bones and what you call 
‘arthritis’ have something to do with arthritis, the correctness of the intuition that I 
mistakenly believe something to do with arthritis is consistent with the required ability of 
thought after all.  
As my beliefs are iterated in a series, there occurs eventually an iteration complex 
enough to defeat human understanding. In other words, complexity of thought will 
eventually defeat the first conjunct of the principle of introspective omniscience, not 
because I lack the concepts embodied in that iteration, nor because I lack the concept of 
belief or of myself, but simply because the iterated thought is too complex for me to 
entertain. Since only God can think thoughts of one-millionth iterated beliefs, my failure 
to obey the principle of introspective omniscience to the same extent shows only that I 
am less than God-like and thus ceases to be much of a failure of rationality at all.  Thus 
the supposition that I believe that p & I don’t believe that I believe that …. I believe that 
p (one that must be true if I am to avoid self-falsifying belief) includes the supposition 
that I lack an iterated belief. As iterations increase, the lack becomes excusable enough to 
cease to count as failure of rationality at all. By contrast, if I truly believe  
(com2) p & I believe that I believe that I believe that not-p 
then I believe that p (since belief distributes over conjunction) and I believe that I believe 
that I believe that not-p (because the second conjunct of what I believe is true). In other 
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words, my belief in om2 avoids self-falsification only if I really have a belief that 
contradicts the belief that I think I believe I have. Here the required ability of thought 
affords no mitigation of irrationality with further iteration, since what is iterated (my 
belief that I believe that not-p) is a belief that I have rather than lack.  So the supposition 
that I truly believe (com1,000,000) already includes the supposition that I have the God-like 
ability of thought required by a one-millionth iterated belief. But for any iteration of om1, 
I am guilty of the same failing, namely that I can hold beliefs all of which are true only if 
I hold contradictory beliefs. The truth of my nth-iterated belief entails the existence of my 
belief n-1, the truth of which entails the existence of my belief n-2 … and so on back 
down the series until I hold contradictory beliefs. So I can only avoid both self-
falsification and contradictory beliefs in believing om1 by mistakenly believing I hold a 
belief (thus failing the principle of introspective infallibility and yet still having the 
ability to have thoughts of the content of that mistaken belief). Thus further iteration of 
om1 does not diminish absurdity.   
 
10. The differential decrease of related absurdity in assertion 
 
We may now explain why subsequent iterations only decrease omissively absurd 
assertions. Suppose that you believe me when I assert  
(om1) p & I don’t believe that I believe that p. 
Since you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you believe that I believe that 
p. And since you believe what I say in the second conjunct, you believe that I don’t 
believe that I believe that p. So if you are to believe me, you must judge that I have a 
 24
belief that I fail to recognise. Thus you may make only the minor criticism that I fail to be 
introspectively omniscient. Likewise if you believe me when I assert   
(com1) p & I believe that I believe that not-p 
then since you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you believe that I believe 
that p. And since you believe what I say in the second conjunct, you believe that I believe 
that I believe that not-p.  So if you are to believe me, you must judge that I really hold a 
belief that p that contradicts what I think I believe (in other words, that I fail the principle 
of introspective infallibility unless I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p). Given 
your charity in withholding the judgement that I have contradictory beliefs, you may 
make only the minor criticism that I’m not introspectively infallible. In either case, you 
can only charitably believe me if you think I’m not introspectively omniscient or not 
introspectively infallible.  
Nonetheless my iterated assertions are less absurd than their original counterparts.  
When I assert om to you, you can only believe me by sacrificing your own rationality in 
acquiring contradictory beliefs. But when I assert om1 to you, you can consistently judge 
that I have a specific belief that I fail to recognise. And the criticism you must make of 
me if you believe me when I assert com, namely that I have contradictory beliefs, is 
severer than that you may charitably make when I assert com1, namely that I hold a 
specific belief that contradicts what I think I believe. As omissive iteration increases, so 
the absurdity of my assertion decreases. That I fail to have a one-millionth-iterated belief 
in what I really do believe is perfectly credible, since neither you nor I can humanly hold 
such beliefs. My assertion becomes a truthful report of psychological limits.  
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By contrast, my credibility in making comissive assertions is not strengthened by 
further iteration. Your judgement that I have a belief that contradicts what I take myself 
(over a million iterations) to believe should be that I am still at fault to the same degree. 
My iterated belief still commits me to a belief that is iterated one order less, and so on 
back down the series until I am committed to contradictory beliefs. If you believe me 
when I assert (com1,00,000), you are still in a position to see that I can avoid contradictory 
beliefs only if, somewhere in the series, I take myself to have a belief that I don’t in fact 
have. 
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Notes 
 
1. Shoemaker’s actual words  [1995, note 1: 227] are that, ‘What can be coherently 
believed constrains what can be coherently asserted but not conversely’.  But since 
‘coherently’ is ambiguous between ‘consistently’, ‘appropriately’ and ‘rationally’ then 
Shoemaker’s constraint had better stick with Moore’s own term ‘absurdly’, by which he 
means ‘irrationally, either in theory or practice’. 
 
2. Against Rosenthal’s claim that ‘Moore’s paradox occurs with sentences… which are 
self-defeating in away that prevents one from making an assertion with them’. [2002: 
167]. 
 
3. This formal difference is disguised by Moore’s examples.  If we formalise ‘I went to 
the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ as ‘p & ~ I believe that p’ then ‘I 
believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ becomes ‘I believe that p & ~p’. By 
commutation this yields ‘~p & I believe that p’.  To achieve canonical reference to belief 
this may be represented as ‘p & I believe that ~p’. 
 
4. Some recent accounts run afoul of the distinction between omissive and comissive 
absurdity.  For example, Rosenthal’s diagnosis [2002: 171] that a Moorean sentence 
denies the occurrence of the intentional state that it also purports to express, fails to 
explain the omissive assertion in which I deny nothing but rather affirm a belief.  By 
contrast Hájeck and Stoljar’s [2001:209] diagnosis of the absurdity of omissive Moorean 
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assertion, that I express contradictory beliefs (because I assert that p and so express a 
belief that p and also assert that I believe that not-p and so express a belief that not-p) 
does not apply to the comissive assertion. 
 
5. As De Almeida [2001: 42] notes, I need the minimal intelligence to present myself 
with such an argument for the absurdity. But this hardly constitutes an objection. 
 
6. Against De Almeida’s objection in [2001: 42-43]. 
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